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The Challenges of Feminist Economics
Wilfred Dolfsma und Hella Hoppe]
Die sozialen Fortschritte und Übergänge
von einer Penode zur anderen erfolgen auf
Grund des Fortschritts in der Befreiung der
Frauen [ ] die Erweiterung der Pnvilegien
der Frauen ist das Prinzip allen sozialen
Fortschritts'
(Charles Fourier cit in Meyer 1977 69)
1 Introduction
The position of women m a society is an mdicator for the general quahty of its
social System. Already at the beginning of the 19th Century this opmion was
expressed by Charles Founer.
However, the actual deconstruction of the Soziale Marktwirtschaft in
Germany seems to worsen the Situation of women especially In Germany 3 7
milhon women are working in compames with only some employees - in retail
trades, doctor's or lawyer's sugenes and hairdresser's salons for example
Whereas in the past an employer with up to three employees didn't come under
the law of protection against wrongful dismissal, now this exception concems
employers with up to ten employees. A result of this change is that much more
women are now without a legal protection against arbitrary dismissal (Monig-
Raane 1996 19).
In extending our Visual angle lt is obvious that in many societies the position
of women is not as well as that of men. When, for instance, all countnes in the
world are compared according to the Human Development Index, that combines
life expectancy, literacy and mcome development, the Netherlands is ranked 4th
and Germany 18*. When this is adjusted for gender, Holland drops to the 1 lth
place whereas Germany goes one rank up. Interestmg is also Japan that drops
from the 3d to the 12 * rank when gender is considered (DGVN 1996 165-
170, (Dutch) Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 1995, Appendices).
The position of women m these countnes, generally considered to be
Erasmus University Rotterdam (the Netherlands) & RWTH Aachen (Germany).
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emancipated countries, are mostiy still worse than that of men. Another
indication of the disadvantaged position of women is their presence at
universities, or rather their absence. In the Netherlands e.g. 31% of the PhD
students are women, whereas in the academic staff only 15.2% and among the
Professors only 5% are female.2 In Germany the Situation is similar: in 1995/96,
35% ofthe Student beginners in economics were female, but only round about
5% of the professors are women (Statistisches Bundesamt 1996; Burkhardt
1995: 52). Bosch (1994) has shown how women were seen as 'naturally'
incapable for academia and thus expelled from universities. In other realms
women were underrepresented as well for the same reasons (Dutch Ministry of
Social Affairs and Employment 1995, Appendices). Nowadays, more and more
women are studying economics and an increasing part of them are doing their
PhD, but the production and distribution of knowledge - that is research and
teaching - are still predominantly tasks of men.
One effect of this dominance of male economists is that the merits of women
economists are nearly unknown. Asking students about women economists the
answer will be probably limited to Joan Robinson, a great economist who
waited in vain for the Nobel Prize that she deserved. The names of Anna
Wheeler or Harnet Taylor, closed collaborators of Robert Owen and John
Stuart Mill - two famous classical economists - seem nearly to be forgotten.
One could argue that economics is an objective science and because of this
independant of the gender of the researcher itself. This is criticized by feminist
economists. They say that economics is socially constmcted and, as a
consequence, gender-biased. In their opinion the gender-blindness of the
dominant neoclassical mainstream economics is one reason for the marginality
of women in economics.
Feminist economists believe that uncovering the gender biases in
economics is a necessary prelude to constructing an economics which can
encompass the perspectives and embody the realities of both women and
men. If gender biases do indeed permeate the discipline, then the
positivist notion that norms do not influence economic research is called
into question. Radical economists would probably be comfortable with
this since they recognize that all theories are shaped by social forces.
Mainstream economists, on the other hand, may find such a project
antithetical to their vision of economics as a universal, value-free science
(Kuiper&Sap 1995:4).
"
Kuiper & Oomes (1994). Figures pertain to the University of Amsterdam.
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In part 2, the methodological and epistemological aspects of feminist
economics will be discussed whereas the repercussions of this methodology in
economic theory and policy are the main topics of part 3 and 4.
2 Methodological and Epistemological Aspects in Feminist Economics
Cunently, feminist discussions conceming science are challenging many
dominant disciplines, methods and theories. Initially, feminist studies dealt
mostiy with the woman question, especially the equality of the sexes and
women rights.3 The science question became more and more important in the
lastyears (Harding 1990: 11).
Many feminists who criticize the sciences believe that to remove the inequality
of women it is not sufficient to incorporate women into the existing, patriarchal
structures and institutions of science. It is desirable "to give voice to the
previously voiceless" and "to illuminate the previously unseen" (Perlich 1992:
15), but not enough. The feminist point is that the underlying structures of
theoretical, methodological and epistemological foundations in science are
gender-biased.
In their opinion, science and knowledge are strongly influenced or even
determined by social, political and economic institutions that are fundamentally
fraught with gender biases and power structures. Important in this connection
is the differentiation between sex and gender. Gender is "something quite
different from biological sex. Gender is the social meaning given to biological
differences between the sexes; it refers to cultural constmcts rather than to
biological givens (Ferber & Nelson 1993: 9f)-" Being children of their time,
scientists adopted and still adopt gender biased structures - consciously and
unconsciously. As a result, the sciences create 'situated knowledges' (Haraway
1988: 575), embedded in social history. Science is not detached from personal
experiences of the researchers and fellow researchers, and it is linked to
patriarchal structures. As a consequence of its socially constructed character,
sciences can not be objective, universal and neutral (Nelson 1996: 39ff).
With Perlich (1992: 34) we have to ask ourselves: "Why [is] economics in
need of a huge dose of feminism?" Feminist economists try to take the findings
of feminist studies to heart and undertake to show that economics "hides behind
Claims of objectivity and neutrality (Perlich 1992: 16)." It wants to expose
Pujol (1992) gives a good summary and overview of initial classical and neoclassical feminist
economics.
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gender biases in their discipline. In their opinion, gender biases in economics
provide the fertile soil for discrimination against women and produce economics
policies that hurt the interests of women. Examples are the kind of policies for
the labour market we discuss in Section 4.
A further aim of feminist economists is to enrich economics in general. That
means investigating "how a richer concepüon of human understanding and
human identity could broaden and improve the field of economics for both
female and male practitioners (Nelson 1992:103)." This aim is informed by the
idea that one of the most important problems with economics is due to its
concepüon of people: the homo economicus is an inadequate, a-social human.
In contrast to the feminist Standpoint that economics are socially constructed,
the dominant mainstream economics is based on the doctrine of positivism.
With the help of descriptive, analytical and mostiy mathematical methods they
are certain that they will reach value-free, universal and objective truths. Lionel
Robbins, the philosopher of economics that has had a strong influence in the
field, puts it thus:
Economics, as a positive science, has no Status as ethical or political
prescription [...] Political economy in my vocabulary is not scientific
economics, a collection of value-free generalisations about the way in
which economic Systems work (Robbins cit. in Hyman 1994: 62).
The roots of this conception of the possibility of an objective and universal
science lie in the western thinking of the 17th and 18th Centimes. In analogy to
the natural sciences and following their deistic world view, people believed that
it would be possible to find in economics natural laws with the help of rational,
logical thinking as well. Main support for this tmst in the human intellect -
'ratio' - was the influential 17th Century French philosopher Rene Descartes.
He divided the world dualistically in 'res cogitans' and 'res extensa'. The
thinking substance, 'res cogitans', he linked to such characteristics as reason,
mind, spirit, objectivity, universality and logic. 'Res extensa', the extended,
mechanistic world, was connected with subjectivity, emotions and intuition.
After and through (?) the cognitive connection of 'res cogitans' with
masculinity and 'res extensa' with femininity, the latter one was devalued as
inferiour to the former (Bordo 1987: 97ff; Perlich 1992: 19f). The 'demarcation
line' - as it is expressed by the economist McCloskey in a book called The
Rhetorics ofEconomics (1985) - lies in between scientific and humanistic, fact
and value, tmth and opinion, positive and normative, precise and vague,
Cognition and feeling, hard and soft, and, of course, between male and female
(McCloskey 1985: 42).
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Feminist economists suggest that this dualistic, hierachical and value-laden
way of thinking became a fundamental principle in economics. The present
methods and theories of neoclassical economic discipline were originally
established in Descartes 'res cogitans'. Through the positive valuation of the
masculine part ofthe world in the Cartesian sense, the ideal of science since the
Enlightment - driving the development of modern sciences, especially classical
and neoclassical economics - is the accumulation of 'objective' and 'value-free'
'facts' that can be known by autonomous individuals. The narrowness of such
economics lies in the fact that methodological and theoretical possibilities of the
"res extensa" are ignored because of their negative connotation. Economics is
limited to the world of rational thinking. Reductionism, categorisation and
decontextualization are constituents of this ideal that led to individualism,
atomism and positivsm in economics.4 The consequence of this development is
that it was forgotten or ignored that sciences' methods and contents, that
claimed to be objective, were gender-biased because they had spmng from 18th
Century European thought.5
So, how do Feminst Economists break the dualistic and hierarchical way of
thinking? One attempt is that of Julie Nelson, a neoclassical economist who
tries to reach a higher level of thinking about gender with the aim to improve
economics in general.
Nelson's starting point is that "the central program of economics is
metaphorically linked with the hierarchical, dualistic conception of gender and
a 'privileging' of a particular conception of masculinity (Nelson 1992: 107)."
Metaphors are understood as a cognitive instrument to organize our thoughts.
As a consequence metaphers are not an addition to language but a constitutive
element, an ability of our thinking and communication (see Klamer & Leonard
1994). Nelson defines gender distinctions as follows:
4
See Perlich (1992: 20). In the mid 18th Century the number of published dictionaries and
encyclopaedias increased strongly. Well-known is especially the Encyclopedie ou Dictionnaire
Raisonne des sciences, des arts et des metiers (1751-1780) by D'Alembert and Diderot. It is a
real mirror of its time. What is interesting for our discussion is that dictionnaires can be
considered as a forme of pure decontextualization and categorisation. The alphabetical order
deprives information ofthe context that gives it its meaning. It is consistent with the positivist idea
that information speaks for itself and needs no interpretation. It's meaning is immediately
apparent to everybody.
The positivist method was critized beföre the feminists did it. Joan Robinson, for instance,
wrote: "to eliminate value judgements from subject matter of social science is to eliminate the
subject itself (cit. in Hyman 1994: 61)."
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I define gender distinctions as cognitive Organizers built on an experience
of sexual dimorphism. As such, I see them not as 'created' by 'society' in
order to 'maintain' some particular order, but formed as a part of the
development of human mental Organization in early childhood (Nelson
1994: 200).
Therefore, gender is more than a sexist difference, it is a cognitive aid like
grammatical articles are classes for substantives. The problem with these
metaphors that permeate (economic) thought is, in Nelson's view, the
hierarchical valuation and the one-dimensional perspective.
To illustrate this point to her critics, Nelson developed a 'Gender-Value-
Compass'. One can distinguish between strong-hard that has a positive
connotation in economics on the one hand. Weak-soft, on the other hand,
'sounds' negative and undesirable. The 'hard' subdisciplines of economics, like
econometrics, deal with facts and try to establish mathematical proves or show
statistically significant evidence, whereas the 'soft' subdisciplines are more like
sociology. The former (pretend to) do quantitative research, and the latter are
more often inclined to qualitative studies. Nelson doesn't overthrow this
dualism with its attached valuation, but she enriches this thinking by adding
further dimensions: weak can be flexible and positive whereas strong can be
rigid and negative. Figure 1 illustrates the point.
Figure 1: Julie Nelson's Gender-Value-Compass
Positive
Masculine
Source:
strong-hard
rigid-hard
Nelson (1992).
flexible-soft
Feminine
weak-soft
Negative
Nelson tries, in this way, to break with the limited, narrow and one-
dimensional perspective of economic mainstream thinking. "Including both
masculine- and feminine-identified positive qualiües [...] makes possible a
practice that is flexible, attentive to context, humanistic, and rieh as well as
strong, logical, scientific and precise (Nelson 1995: 139)."
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Up to here, the feminist economists seem to be a homogenous group, but they
differ in their methodological and theoretical degree of critique. Below are some
remarks on perhaps three of the different movements within 'Feminist
Economics':
* Feminist constructionism try to expose, as it is described above, gender-
biased influences on theories, methods and believes. We believe this is the
most fmitful approach.
* Supporters of the affirmative action approach are convinced that the only
task of feminist economists is to improve the position of women and to
boost the representation of women in economics without developing a
critique of economics itself.
* Feminist empirists are similary uncritical conceming economics. They say
that methods and theory are in principal gender-neutral and objective;
discrimination and promoted inequalities of women are results of a wrong
or lack of application in economics.
(Ferber & Nelson 1993: 8ff)
3 Feminist Economic Theory
For many feminist economists the methodological considerations discussed in
Section 2 of this paper have repercussions in terms of economic theory. The
Standard, neoclassical economic theory that assumes that all humans are equal
and maximize given and unchanging preferences is wrong according to them.
Before discussing some of the alternatives suggested, we will first shortly
discuss neoclassical economics and the possibility of a feminist economic
theory based on these grounds. We will do so by taking the case of a well-
known neoclassical economist and Noble Laureat whose ideas have attracted
a lot of attention from feminist economists.
Gary Becker is known for applying the neoclassical framework in contexts of
which one would not tend to think economic theory is applicable. He is also not
afraid of drawing the conclusions that logically follow from the theory.
Marriages, drug addictions, preferences for classical music, the giving of alms,
criminal activities, decisions to educate oneself, etc. are all utility-maximizing
activities. Economists are urged not to discuss the formation or change of
preferences. These are assumed fixed and unchanging: De Gustibus Non Est
Disputandum. People usually prefer more of one thing over less of it, ceteris
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paribus,6 and thus we can assume that they maximize their preferences. Such
behaviour we call rational. The point is not so much if these assumptions are
'realistic', but if they 'work': do the assumptions allow us to make predictions
that will come true?
The improvement over the previous views in economics on the family to which
it was a "black box' is that decision making problems are explicitly addressed
by Becker cum suis. Thus, Becker (1991) argues for instance, that the way in
which families are ananged in many Western countries is a rational one.
Production and consumption tasks are efficiently distributed. If there would
have been a better way to divide the labour within a family, it would have
developed off its own. Arrangements as they exist are considered to be efficient
in that they apparently maximize people's preferences.7
This almost circular argument flies in the face of many people's personal
experiences. Inequalities that are not the result of some process of optimization
but of historical developments or of differences in people's power abound. The
positivist methodology and ideological underpinnings of neoclassical economics
do not allow for considerations of power, the questioning of extant
circumstances and the incorporation of supra-individual concepts into the
framework. Certainly there must be something wrong with a theory that favours
and defends the Status quo in which many people are disadvantaged? As Van
Velzen (1994) puts it: families can also be arenas where interests conflict and
bargaining power decides on how labour is divided among its members.8
Still you will find female or feminist economists adhere to the neoclassical
economics, saying that it is a simple yet powerful theoretical construct that
allows economists to address many issues in a rigorous manner (Gustafsson
1993, 1994). The only thing that is wrong and can easily be mended. The
conclusions drawn from economic theory and analysis can be interpreted in
different ways but are usually interpreted by default in a way that favours men.
As developments in the sociology and philosophy of science since Camap and
Popper finally trickle down in economics, however, the scope for an economic
theory different from neoclassical economics biroadens. No longer is it possible
6
Ceterisparibus means that all other circumstances are assumed not to change. Using the p.c.
clause is an important trick economists use to make the theory work in real life.
7
See Van Velzen (1994) for a more elaborate treatment of this subject.
Economics has attempted to get rid of Mdeology' and thus become a 'hard' and 'positive'
science, but has never really grasped that this is impossible (Ridley 1983). As a consequence,
power as an analytical concept is looked upon with suspicion.
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to dismiss institutional, rhetoncal or marxist economics off-hand (see a o Maki
1993 and Dolfsma 1997)
Feminist economics has not developed a coherent theoretical framework yet
Thus, the question of what holds femmist economists together if it is not a
common and agreed upon theoretical core of ideas becomes acute. It was
lmphcitly raised in a discussion on the internet discussion hst FEMECON-L by
Luigi Bini in September 19969 Bim asked if it would not be a good idea to
change the label of feminist economics to human economics. Susan Feiner's
reply is in the same vetn as the discussion between Bergmann (1995) and
Woolley (1996) on Becker's theory of the family is Feiner said that feminist
economics 'addresses a literature and a pohtics of CHANGE', and thus allows
for amultiplicityof Strands of thought Bergmann is concemed with the same
thing. She argues that Becker is apologetic of the Status quo and that therefore
bis theory should be rejeeted. Woolley does not entirely agree She said there are
or might be some things that feminist economics can leam from Becker. "Yes,
Becker has wntten on the family. It is important to acknowledge his
contnbution, along with the contnbutions of all the other women and men who
have furthered our understanding of families" Woolley (1996, p.l 18) says
It is not just our own personal preference that we would hke to make a case for
a tie between institutional economics and feminist economics. Waller (1995)
has persuasively argued that these two Strands of thought share many
methodological points and can easily be reconciled. Both reject simple dualistic
thinking, both see knowledge and value as socially constructed and both reject
an economisüc approach of phenomena that take place outside a market (Waller
1995, p.l67). Institutions, hke the family, are supra-individual entiües that are
by no means necessanly socially efficient. Institutional economics has
'institutions' as its central concept. In recent years institutional economics is in
the advent, in its history it has developed a number of theones of how
institutions change or emerge.10
The unequal position that many women find themselves in, could for mstance
be understood from a marxist perspective, but will not venture mto that here.
What we want to try to develop here is how an institutional economist could
9
Everybody can follow and take part in the discussion on this hst by sending an email message
to hstserv@bucknell edu, with m the mam body the text subscnbe FEMECON-L mail <your
name>
Institutional economics is not homogenous either, in the remainder we will focuss on what is
called neo institutional economics that is more akin to sociology and draws on the pragmatic
philosophy of Dewey and Peirce (see e g Hodgson 1993)
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shed light on the issue. One of the founders of institutional economics is
Thorstein Veblen. Now, "Veblen saw women's position in economic society as a
reflection of theprevailing system of Status and values" (Peterson & Brown 1994:
XHI). The institutions of a society reflect its values; women were not considered
worthy of working, at least when there was no strong need for it. In his influential
book The Theory ofthe Leisure Class, Veblen showed how women were 'used' to
gain Status. The fact that they didn't work was a sign of wealth. Although the book
was published in the previous Century, it's analysis is still applicable. The
institutions according to which people learn to behave as they grow up change
slowly. However, when there is no clear alternative in sight, giving up the
institutions that are repressive to women can be a difficult thing to do for people.
Institutions do, of course, make sure that uncertainty is decreased. Letting those
institutions go would inciease that uncertainty. We think it is a valid assumption to
believe that people strongly dislike uncertain circumstances. From experiments it
is also known that - depending on how the circumstances are described to people -
people prefer the sure small loss to the unsure big gain where the possibility of an
important loss is also there." From this perspective it can be understood why
parents/mothers teach their children to behave in a way that keeps women in a
disadvantageous position. From personal experience, for instance, we know that the
institution of dowry is most fiercely supported by the mothers Indian women. The
mother particularly persists in paying a sum of money to the parents of the
bridegroom for allowing her to marry him. Clearly, this can not be explained in
terms of mainstream, neoclassical economics. We suggest, therefore, that
institutional economic theory comes more natural to feminist scholars addressing
economic issues.
4 Economic Policy
Feminist economic thought also permeates to the economic policy options
advocated. This is what it is all about, improving the position of women in society.
Where the position ofwomen in Western societies is most disadvantageous is the
family.12 For the purpose of the paper we propose to keep with this example. Not
because we want to perpetuate and thus strengthen existing gender specific division
of labour, but because here is where changes in policy has important effects on the
11
In recent years the kind of research that Tversky & Kahnemann (1981) have initiated finally
gets used more and more in economics. Institutional economics can easily incorporate those ideas
(Dolfsma 1996).
12
Here the fact that feminist economics finds most of its followers in the United States possibly
becomes most apparent.
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position of women. Economic policy related to the family mspired by feminist
thought ranges from the recogniüon that unpaid work is valuable too, to the
parücipation of women in the money economy, to the problemaüc valuation of care-
givmg activities. We want to focus on these issues here.
Bruyn-Hundt (1996) shows how most of the work that people do is unpaid work.
Women, however do most of that work and by not valuing it in terms of money,
such work tends not to be appreciated. Bruyn-Hundt proposes that by trying to
value such labour, many biases m economic policy can be avoided and the position
of women will improve. She has a pomt if we don't see something, we tend not to
lncorporate into our analyses. Thus, in policy developed for Third World countnes,
the informal sector and 'household' production are often ignored. There are
examples of such policy that have had horrendous consequences because of it, but
that we will not go into nght now.
The Dutch govemment is now, for instance, producing number of plans to make
the distnbution of paid and unpaid labour more equitable and to improve the
relative position of women m general. One proposal from the Commissie
Toekomstscenano's Herverdeling Onbetaalde Arbeid (Committee Future
Scenano's of Redistnbuüng Unpaid Labour) to redistnbute unpaid labour more
equitable among men and women was taken up, as well as the idea that more
unpaid labour should enter the commercial realm. For this purpose some very
concrete measures are proposed and taken. Men can take some time off to take care
of their children, the possibihty of bnngmg children to day-care centres is
broadened, etc. Furthermore, women who have left the labour market to raise
children and no longer have the adequate human capital are educated to take up a
job again.
Nevertheless, there are important objections to valuing such household and
informal activities in terms of money. As the German philosopher and sociologist
Simmel (1907) has argued a long time, and social scientists today Start to
reappreciate, human relaüons change fundamentally when money is introduced and
becomes a dominant factor. Care is a pertinent example. The young, the old and the
disabled need to be cared for, but the way m which a socieües takes care of this
differs and changes.13
Not only do these changes have profound consequences on society, which makes
it adamant to take ethical considerations mto our analysis, but they lead us to
13
See a report by the International Council of Women (1995)
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questions about the methodology of economics as well. Which brings us back to the
discussion on economic methodology in Section 2 of the text.
5 Concluding Remarks
Feminist economics is challenging the Status quo in economics in many ways.
First of all, it questions the methodological foundations of orthodox neoclassical
economics. Based on these critiques, secondly, strides are taken to develop
economic theories that are sensitive to many people's experience that many things
are unfair and means are unequally distributed on the one hand and have taken the
methodological discussions that loom large in this field to heart. Economic policies
that improve the disadvantaged position of women especially are discussed too. As
we showed, concentrating more specifically on the economic theory of and
economic policy for the family, that these themes are interrelated.
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